On Monday, May 13 2019, 14:00 - 15:30, Rob Pryce (Sheffield University) will present:
The Effect of the United Kingdom Smoking Ban on Alcohol Spending
The effect of smoking bans on alcohol consumption is unclear, and this is especially true of the differing effect on smokers and nonsmokers. This paper uses spending survey data to examine the effect of the United Kingdom smoking bans on alcohol spending. It finds the introduction of a smoking ban decreased alcohol expenditure, specifically in the on-trade (pubs and restaurants) and amongst smokers. This was not compensated for through an increase in alcohol expenditure amongst non-smokers. The smoking ban may have affected on-premise outlets through a reduction in revenue. Tobacco and alcohol policies should not be evaluated in isolation, as these are joint behaviours and a change in policy affecting one behaviour will have effects on the other.
Room: WST-A.02.04, Weststadttürme Berliner Platz 6-8, Essen
On Monday, April 29 2019, 14:00 - 15:30, Thomas Mayrhofer (Hochschule Stralsund) will present:
Prudence and Prevention: An Empirical Investigation
Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions (in the sense of self-protection) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order risk aversion). We study empirically whether these theoretical results hold and prudent individuals show less preventive effort (in the sense of self-protection) than non-prudent individuals. We use a unique dataset that combines data on (higher-order) risk preference and various measures regarding prevention, such as the use of flu vaccination (prevention in the sense of self-protection) and mammograms (prevention in the sense of self-insurance). We find that for high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age, prudence has a significant negative impact on the likelihood of undergoing flu vaccination. We find no such effects for screening methods such as mammographs, i.e. prevention in the sense of self-insurance.
Abstract: The paper analyzes the impact of physicians' altruism and motivation on the outcomes of pay-for-performance schemes in healthcare, where a fixed price contract on quantity is supplemented with a relative performance contract on quality. Our theoretical model forecasts crowding out of most altruistic types. In an empirical application to the Medicare's nationwide natural experiment with a relative performance contract on quality for acute inpatient care since 2013, we observe the proof of this prediction. Namely, the quality dimensions, which are linked to patient's benefit, demonstrate higher deterioration among top-performing hospitals than other incentivized dimensions.