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CINCH - Health Economics Research Center

New CINCH working paper


A new working paper has been added to the CINCH working paper series: “Education and Health: Long-Run Effects of Peers, Tracking and Years” by  Martin Fischer, Ulf-G Gerdtham, Gawain Heckley, Martin Karlsson, Gustav Kjellsson and Therese Nilsson.

Abstract: We investigate two parallel school reforms in Sweden to assess the long-run health effects of education. One reform only increased years of schooling, while the other increased years of schooling but also removed tracking leading to a more mixed socioeconomic peer group. By differencing the effects of the parallel reforms, we can separate the effect of de-tracking and peers from that of more schooling. We find that the pure years of schooling reform reduced mortality and improved current health. Differencing the effects of the reforms shows significant differences in the estimated impacts, suggesting that de-tracking and subsequent peer effects resulted in worse health.

See all working papers.

Essen Health Economics Seminar @ CINCH Essen


On Monday, October 21 2019, 14:00 - 15:30, Maryna Ivets (University of Duisburg-Essen) will present:

You Can Win by Losing! Incentivizing Motivation and Self-Control Preferences: Evidence from Weight Loss Program

In this paper we investigate self-control and motivation in connection to weight loss. We first develop a theoretical model and then test its conclusions with data from DietBet. The theoretical model, based on Gul & Pesendorfer (2001), studies a two-period decision problem of an agent who is tempted by inferior choices in period 2. A random and time-variant degree of motivation is introduced into the model to influence his perceived cost of self-control. An agent is faced with a given menu and has to exercise self-control. We introduce a commitment mechanism (a bet) that can help an agent commit to his normative choice in period 2. Theoretical results show that placing a bet on himself can help an agent to commit successfully, and also can explain why an agent with a preference for commitment can fail (behavior that is usually attributed to preference reversal). This commitment failure is associated with agent's overestimation of his future self-control's cost. We also distinguish between sophisticated and naive agents and show that placing higher wagers on themselves can help these agents commit. Our empirical results suggest that the bet mechanism encourages weight loss. More specifically, higher betting stakes are associated with greater weight loss. Overall, by placing higher wagers on themselves agents can avoid underinvestment in their future self-control and increase their chances for successful commitment.

Room: WST-C.02.12, Weststadttürme Berliner Platz 6-8, Essen

To find more on upcoming seminars, click here.