Abstract: To insure policyholders against contemporaneous health expenditure shocks and future reclassification risk, long-term health insurance constitutes an alternative to community-rated short-term contracts with an individual mandate. Relying on unique claims panel data from a large private insurer in Germany, we study a real-world long-term health insurance application with a life-cycle perspective. We show that German long-term health insurance (GLTHI) achieves substantial welfare gains compared to a series of risk-rated short-term contracts. Although, by its simple design, the premium setting of GLTHI contract departs significantly from the optimal dynamic contract, surprisingly we only find modest welfare differences between the two. Finally, we conduct counterfactual policy experiments to illustrate the welfare consequences of integrating GLTHI into a system with a “Medicare-like” public insurance that covers people above 65.
The junior professorship for Empirical Health Economics (Prof. Dr. Katharina Blanakrt) at the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration at the University of Duisburg-Essen is looking for an Student assistant 10 hours per week
On Monday, January 20 2020, 14:00 - 15:30, Adam Pilny (RWI Essen) will present:
Political Distortions in Public Hospital Funding
Investment funding for hospitals in Germany is at the discretion of the federal states, giving leeway for political influence and distortions. We investigate whether government ideology affects the allocation of public capital funds to hospitals of different ownership. We use self-compiled historical data of the German hospital market between 1955 and 2018 and link this information to political data, state budget accounts, and socioeconomics of German states. We estimate regression discontinuity design (RDD) models exploiting close election outcomes where only few pivotal votes led to a left-wing or right-wing government. First results show that left-wing governments disadvantage private hospital providers in capital funding compared to public hospitals. We also investigate whether electoral cycles, economic-trained health ministers and fiscal decentralization play a role.
Room: WST-C.02.12, Weststadttürme Berliner Platz 6-8, Essen