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Monday Health Economics Seminar


On Monday May 7, 2018, 14:00 - 15:30 Helmuth Cremer (TSE, University of Toulouse) will present:

Long-term care policy with nonlinear strategic bequests

We study the design of long-term care (LTC) policies when children differ in their cost of providing informal care. Parents do not observe this cost, but they can commit to a "bequests rule" specifying a transfer conditional on the level of informal care. Care provided by high-costchildren is distorted downwards in order to minimize the rent of low-cost ones. Social LTC insurance is designed to maximize a weighted sum of parents' and children's utility. The optimal uniform public LTC provision strikes a balance between insurance and children's utility. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion less than full insurance is provided to mitigate the distortion on informal care which reduces children's rents. A nonuniform policy conditioning LTC benefits on bequests provides full insurance even against the risk of having children with a high cost of providing care. Quite surprisingly the level of informal care induced by the optimal (uniform or nonuniform) policy always increases in the children's welfare weight.

Room: WST-C.02.12, Weststadttürme Berliner Platz 6-8, Essen.

To find more on upcoming seminars, click here.