P4P / Pay for Performance

The project P4P applies experimental economic methods to study the behavior of actors in health care, particularly of independent physicians. Understanding and even predicting their behavior allows for well-founded policy recommendations on how best to increase competition in the health care system. By conducting laboratory experiments not only with student subjects but also with physicians themselves, a thorough understanding of physician preferences can be achieved.

Publications

  • Fischbacher, U., Kairies-Schwarz, N., and U. Stefani: Non-Additivity and the Salience of Marginal Productivities: Experimental Evidence on Distributive Fairness. Forthcoming in Economica (2016).
  • Brosig-Koch, J., Hennig-Schmidt, H., Kairies-Schwarz, N. and D. Wiesen: Using artefactual field and lab experiments to investigate the effect of fee-for-service and capitation on medical service provision. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2015). doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.011 Details
  • Brosig-Koch, J., Heinrich, T. and C. Helbach: Exploring the capability to reason backwards: An experimental study with children, adolescents, and young adults. European Economic Review (2015), 74,  286-302.
  • Brosig-Koch, J., Hennig-Schmidt, H.,  Kairies-Schwarz, N. and D. Wiesen: The Effects of Introducing Mixed Payment Systems for Physicians: Experimental Evidence. Health Economics (2015). doi:10.1002/hec.3292 Details
  • Kairies, N.: Pay-for-Performance, Reputation, and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision. Economics Bulletin, Vol. 33 No. 3 p.A211 (2013). Details
  • Brosig-Koch, J., Heinrich, T. and C. Helbach: Does truth win when teams reason strategically? Economics Letters (2014), 123(1), 86-89.
  • Brosig-Koch, J. and T. Heinrich: Reputation and mechanism choice in procurement auctions: An experiment. Production and Operations Management (2014), 23(2), 210-220.
  • Kokot, J., 2014. Die experimentelle Methodik in der Gesundheitsökonomik. In: Matusiewicz, D. and J. Wasem: Gesundheitsökonomie- Bastandsaufnahme und Entwicklungsperspektiven, Schriften der Gesellschaft für Sozialen Fortschritt e.V. (GSF), Band 30, 51-68.
  • Bolton, G.E. and J. Brosig-Koch: How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication. International Journal of Game Theory (2012), (41), 623-649.