P4P / Pay for Performance
Research
The project P4P applies experimental economic methods to study the behavior of actors in health care, particularly of independent physicians. Understanding and even predicting their behavior allows for well-founded policy recommendations on how best to increase competition in the health care system. By conducting laboratory experiments not only with student subjects but also with physicians themselves, a thorough understanding of physician preferences can be achieved.
Publications
- Fischbacher, Urs; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Stefani, Ulrike: Non-additivity and the Salience of Marginal Productivities: Experimental Evidence on Distributive Fairness. In: Economica, Vol84 (2017), p. 587-610. Details Citation
- Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Wiesen, Daniel: The effects of introducing mixed payment systems for physicians: Experimental evidence. In: Health Economics, Vol26 (2017), p. 243-262. Details Full textCitation
- Kokot, Johanna: Die experimentelle Methodik in der Gesundheitsökonomik. 2014 (ISBN: 978-3-428-14442-6). Details Citation
- Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo; Helbach, Christoph: Exploring the capability to reason backwards: An experimental study with children, adolescents, and young adults. In: European Economic Review, Vol74 (2015), p. 286-302. Details Citation
- Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Wiesen, Daniel: Using artefactual field and lab experiments to investigate how fee-for-service and capitation affect medical service provision. In: Journal of Economic Behavior \\& Organization, Vol131 (2016), p. 17-23. Details Full textCitation
- Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo: Reputation and mechanism choice in procurement auctions: An experiment. In: Production and Operations Management, Vol23 (2014), p. 210-220. Details Citation
- Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo; Helbach, Christoph: Does truth win when teams reason strategically?. In: Economics letters, Vol123 (2014), p. 86-89. Details Citation
- Kairies, Nadja; Others: Pay-for-Performance, Reputation, and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision. In: Economics Bulletin, Vol35 (2015), p. 702-715. Details Citation
- Bolton, Gary E; Brosig-Koch, Jeannette E: How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication. In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol41 (2012), p. 623-649. Details Citation
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