P4P / Pay for Performance

Research

The project P4P applies experimental economic methods to study the behavior of actors in health care, particularly of independent physicians. Understanding and even predicting their behavior allows for well-founded policy recommendations on how best to increase competition in the health care system. By conducting laboratory experiments not only with student subjects but also with physicians themselves, a thorough understanding of physician preferences can be achieved.

Publications

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  • Fischbacher, Urs; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Stefani, Ulrike: Non-additivity and the Salience of Marginal Productivities: Experimental Evidence on Distributive Fairness. In: Economica, Vol 84 (2017), p. 587-610. CitationDetails
  • Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Wiesen, Daniel: The effects of introducing mixed payment systems for physicians: Experimental evidence. In: Health Economics, Vol 26 (2017), p. 243-262. Full textCitationDetails
  • Kokot, Johanna: Die experimentelle Methodik in der Gesundheitsökonomik. 2014. CitationDetails
  • Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo; Helbach, Christoph: Exploring the capability to reason backwards: An experimental study with children, adolescents, and young adults. In: European Economic Review, Vol 74 (2015), p. 286-302. CitationDetails
  • Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Wiesen, Daniel: Using artefactual field and lab experiments to investigate how fee-for-service and capitation affect medical service provision. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol 131 (2016), p. 17-23. Full textCitationDetails
  • Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo: Reputation and mechanism choice in procurement auctions: An experiment. In: Production and Operations Management, Vol 23 (2014), p. 210-220. CitationDetails
  • Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo; Helbach, Christoph: Does truth win when teams reason strategically?. In: Economics letters, Vol 123 (2014), p. 86-89. CitationDetails
  • Kairies, Nadja; Others: Pay-for-Performance, Reputation, and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision. In: Economics Bulletin, Vol 35 (2015), p. 702-715. CitationDetails
  • Bolton, Gary E; Brosig-Koch, Jeannette E: How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication. In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol 41 (2012), p. 623-649. CitationDetails

Research Associates